## **EXHIBIT 3**

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- 1 -
1
     UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2
     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3
     Case No. 05-44481 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02619 (RDD);
4
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02242 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02256 (RDD);
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     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02333 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02580 (RDD);
6
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02661 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02743 (RDD);
7
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02768 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02769 (RDD);
8
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02790 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02076 (RDD);
9
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02084 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02096 (RDD);
10
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02125 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02177 (RDD);
11
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02188 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02211 (RDD);
12
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02212 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02236 (RDD);
13
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02250 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02262 (RDD);
14
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02270 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02291 (RDD);
15
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02328 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02337 (RDD);
16
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02348 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02432 (RDD);
17
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02436 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02449 (RDD);
18
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02479 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02525 (RDD);
19
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02534 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02539 (RDD);
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     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02551 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02581 (RDD);
21
     Adv. Proc. No. 07-02597 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02618 (RDD);
22
      Adv. Proc. No. 07-02623 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02659 (RDD);
23
      Adv. Proc. No. 07-02672 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02702 (RDD);
24
      Adv. Proc. No. 07-02723 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02743 (RDD);
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	- 2 -		
1	Adv. Proc. No. 07-02744 (RDD); Adv. Proc. No. 07-02750 (RDD);		
2	Adv. Proc. No. 07-02188 (RDD)		
3	x		
4	In the Matter of:		
5	DPH HOLDINGS CORP., et al.,		
6	Reorganized Debtors.		
7	x		
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,		
9	Plaintiffs,		
10	-against-		
11	SETECH INC., et al.,		
12	Defendants.		
13			
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,		
15	Plaintiffs,		
16	-against-		
17	DUPONT COMPANY, et al.,		
18	Defendants.		
19	X		
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,		
21	Plaintiffs,		
22	-against-		
23	ECO-BAT AMERICA LLC,		
24	Defendant.		
25	= = _ = _ =		

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1	
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
3	Plaintiffs,
4	-against-
5	GLOBE MOTORS INC.,
6	Defendant.
7	
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
9	Plaintiffs,
10	-against-
11	PHILIPS SEMICONDUCTOR, et al.,
12	Defendants.
13	
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
15	Plaintiffs,
16	-against-
17	SUMMIT POLYMERS INC.
18	Defendant.
19	
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
21	Plaintiffs,
22	-against-
23	M & Q PLASTIC PRODUCTS, et al.,
24	Defendants.
25	

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1	
1	
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
3	Plaintiffs,
4	-against-
5	RSR CORPORATION, et al.,
6	Defendants.
7	x
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
9	Plaintiffs,
10	-against-
11	RSR/ECOBAT,
12	Defendant.
13	
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
15	Plaintiffs,
16	-against-
17	TYCO et al.,
18	Defendants.
19	
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
21	Plaintiffs,
22	-against-
	AHAUS TOOL & ENGINEERING INC.,
23	Defendant.
24	
25	

	- 5 -
1	x
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
3	Plaintiffs,
4	-against-
5	A 1 SPECIALIZED SVC & SUPP., INC.,
6	Defendant.
7	
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
9	Plaintiffs,
10	-against-
11	A-1 SPECIALIZED SERVICES,
12	Defendant.
13	
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
15	Plaintiffs,
16	-against=
17	ATS AUTOMATION TOOLING SYSTEMS INC., et al.,
18	Defendants.
19	
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
21	Plaintiffs,
22	-against-
23	CORNING INC., et al.,
24	Defendants.
25	X

	- 6 -
1	x
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
3	Plaintiffs,
4	-against-
5	CRITECH RESEARCH INC.,
6	Defendant.
7	x
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
9	Plaintiffs,
10	-against-
11	DOSHI PRETTL INTERNATIONAL, et al.,
12	Defendants.
13	
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
15	Plaintiffs,
16	-against-
17	D & R TECHNOLOGY LLC, et al.,
18	Defendants.
19	= = = x
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
21	Plaintiffs,
22	-against-
23	DSSI, et al.,
24	Defendants.
25	x

	- 7 -
1	x
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
3	Plaintiffs,
4	-against-
5	DANOBAT MACHINE TOOL CO. INC.,
6	Defendant.
7	= x
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
9	Plaintiffs,
10	-against-
11	EDS, et al.,
12	Defendants.
13	x
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
15	Plaintiffs,
16	-against-
17	BP, et al.,
18	Defendants.
19	# X
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
21	Plaintiffs,
22	-against-
23	CARLISLE, et al.,
24	Defendants.
25	x

	- 8 -	
1	x	
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
3	Plaintiffs,	
4	-against-	
5	GKNS INTERMETALS,	
6	Defendant.	
7	~ ~ ~ _ ~ _ ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~	
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
9	Plaintiffs,	
10	-against-	
11	EX-CELL-O MACHINE TOOLS INC.,	A Comment
12	Defendant.	
13	x	Ì
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
15	Plaintiffs,	
16	-against-	
17	JOHNSON CONTROLS, et al.,	
18	Defendants.	
19		
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
21	Plaintiffs,	
22	-against-	
23	NILES USA INC., et al.,	
24	Defendants.	ALCO CALCULATION OF THE PERSON
25		

		- 9 -
1		x
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
3	Plaintif	fs,
4	-against-	
5	METHODE ELECTRONICS INC., et	al.,
6	Defendar	ts.
7		<del>-</del> -x
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
9	Plaintif	fs,
10	-against-	
11	MICROCHIP,	
12	Defendar	t.
13		x
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
15	Plaintif	fs,
16	-against-	
17	HEWLETT PACKARD, et al.,	
18	Defendar	ts.
19	(	x
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
21	Plaintit	fs,
22	-against-	
23	OLIN CORP,	
24	Defendar	t.
25		x

		- 10 -
1	x	
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
3	Plaintiffs,	
4	-against-	
5	INTEC GROUP,	
6	Defendant.	
7		
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
9	Plaintiffs,	
10	-against-	
11	VALEO, et al.,	
12	Defendants.	
13	x	
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
15	Plaintiffs,	
16	-against-	
17	VANGUARD DISTRIBUTORS,	
18	Defendant.	
19	H X	
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
21	Plaintiffs,	
22	-against-	
23	VICTORY PACKAGING, et al.,	
24	Defendants.	
25	x	

		- 11 -
1	x	
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
3	Plaintiffs,	
4	-against-	
5	WAGNER-SMITH COMPANY,	
6	Defendant.	
7	x	
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
9	Plaintiffs,	
10	-against-	
11	WELLS FARGO BUSINESS, et al.,	
12	Defendants.	
13	x	
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
15	Plaintiffs,	
16	-against-	
17	SELECT TOOL & DIE CORP.,	
18	Defendant.	
19	X	
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
21	Plaintiffs,	
22	-against-	
23	SHUERT INDUSTRIES INC.,	
24	Defendant.	
25		

	- 12 -
1	x
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
3	Plaintiffs,
4	-against-
5	SUMITOMO, et al.,
6	Defendants.
7	_ = = x
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
9	Plaintiffs,
10	-against-
11	TECH CENTRAL,
12	Defendant.
13	12
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
15	Plaintiffs,
16	-against-
17	PRUDENTIAL RELOCATION, et al.,
18	Defendants.
19	X
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,
21	Plaintiffs,
22	-against-
23	LDI INCORPORATED,
24	Defendant.
25	X

		- 13 -
1		x
2	DELPHI CORPORATION, et al.,	
3	Pla	ntiffs,
4	-against-	
5	M & Q PLASTIC PRODUCTS,	et al.,
6	Defe	endants.
7		<del>-</del> x
8	DELPHI CORPORATION, et a	al.,
9	Pla	intiffs,
10	-against-	
11	REPUBLIC ENGINEERED PRO	DUCTS, et al.,
12	Def	endants.
13	28-6	≈ = = -x
14	DELPHI CORPORATION, et	al.,
15	Pla	intiffs,
16	-against-	
17	RIECK GROUP LLC,	
18	Def	endant.
19		X
20	DELPHI CORPORATION, et	al.,
21	Pla	intiffs,
22	-against-	
23	CRITECH RESEARCH INC.,	
24	Def	endant.
25		x

## 05-44481-rdd Doc 20850-3 Filed 11/23/10 Entered 11/23/10 15:29:26 Exhibit 3 Pg 15 of 26

t i	=	14 -
1	U.S. Bankruptcy Court	
2	300 Quarropas Street	
3	White Plains, New York	
4		
5	July 22, 2010	
6	10:20 AM	
7		
8		
9	BEFORE:	
10	HON. ROBERT D. DRAIN	
11	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE	
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- 202 **-**

The movants' complaint that we haven't identified the specific debtor entity that made the transfer, and we haven't identified the specific transferee. And --

THE COURT: And that there's an antecedent debt.

MR. FISHER: An antecedent debt. And I think that the debtors have no choice but to concede that under Twombly and Iqbal, more detailed pleading would be required, at least according to some of the more recent cases, although, I don't know that there's a controlling case in this circuit yet describing exactly what that standard would entail.

And what we've attempted to do, and what we suggested in our opposition brief, was a practical way of cutting through this, and, essentially treating it as similar to a 12(e) motion and saying that to the extent that there's any defendant who cannot prepare its answer to this complaint, because knowing the date and the amount of the transfer is insufficient to allow it to track down the relevant information, we will supplement that and provide whatever additional information is needed in order to put them in a position to be able to respond to the complaint, which, at the end of the day, is what Rule 8, even after Twombly and Iqbal, is all about.

And so we're simply trying to be practical here.

THE COURT: Well, is there any -- two things. Is there any authority for the notion and -- I guess Twombly was after these were filed, too?

- 203 -

MR. FISHER: Yes.

THE COURT: Is there anything in the notion that you don't have to comply with them because it was filed beforehand?

MR. FISHER: I don't think that there's a case directly on point. Because, again, we have a situation where the case was filed before Twombly and Iqbal and then served after. I'm not aware of a case that's directly on point. So the question is how to bring these cases up to --

THE COURT: So then --

MR. FISHER: -- date with the new pleading standards.

THE COURT: Well, and on that, shouldn't there be a motion to amend? I mean, is there any authority for the mechanism you're proposing? I mean, if there's merit to the argument that you had filed these complaints under the laws that existed at the time, and there's, certainly, you know, the case law in the Southern District, was probably more on your side on that than not. As far as what you needed to show back then, wouldn't that just be a factor I'd take into account among other factors in your motion to amend? And then we'd have an amended complaint and everyone would know the complaint that they were looking to.

You know, if, in fact, you weren't able to show an antecedent debt, or you weren't able to show which debtor made the transfer, then, you know, there'd be a complaint that someone could move to dismiss even if, you know, I thought

DEN HOLDINGS CORF., et al.
- 204 -
there was enough to let the complaint be filed. But at least
they'd see it as a and that could be one of their factors in
objecting to the motion to amend, is that this complaint has no
chance of succeeding because they still haven't identified the
transferor, for example.
MR. FISHER: We think that's there's something very
technical about the argument that's being made here. And that
as a practical matter, based on the information that is
supplied in the complaint, the movants are in an adequate
position to respond intelligently to the complaint.
Sure, we could bring a motion seeking leave to amend
these complaints. Alternatively, if the Court is going to rule
that the complaints need to be repled to comply with the
Twombly/Iqbal standard, we could do that.
THE COURT: Well, I guess I want to go back to my
earlier question. I haven't seen a solution like the one
you've proposed; do you have authority for that?
MR. FISHER: I don't have a case, Your Honor
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FISHER: that essentially converts a 12(b)(6)
motion to a 12(e) motion. But conceptually that is what we had
in mind. But if the problem is if 12(e) requires more
information than what had been
THE COURT: I think it's more than just having the

defendant come to you and say I'm puzzled, I don't know how to

- 205 -
defend. I think it is an affirmative requirement to state a
claim. And under Iqbal and Twombly and the cases, including
Judge Gonzalez' case on preferences, there's certain key
elements of the claim that require more than just the a
recitation of the elements of the claim. I mean, that's really
the that's really Twombly as opposed to Iqbal.
MR. FISHER: Right.
THE COURT: And that's, you know, basically, who made
the transfer, and what was the antecedent debt? Something,
other than just saying it was for antecedent debt. I mean, I
think by listing the amount and the date, I think it was
implicit that you're saying its defendant. But maybe I'm wrong
about that. If you're asserting against some of the people 550
relief then you probably should say how they got it.
MR. FISHER: Well, I think that it's just that
THE COURT: Not immediate not the transferee but
subsequent transferee relief.
MR. FISHER: The strange thing about applying Twombly
and Iqbal to a preference case is that what does it mean to say
that a preference claim is plausible? I mean, it's plausible
that Delphi paid these defendants the amounts that are
indicated on the complaint on the dates that are indicated.
And it's plausible that those payments were on account of
antecedent debt

THE COURT: First of all, it's not Delphi, there's

- 206 -

like forty-two debtors here. So it's not listed who did this.

I think that's important. And that leaves the issue of antecedent debt.

I'm somewhat sympathetic to your point on that, although, the three judges that have considered this, including Judge Gonzalez, aren't. They all emphasize the need to say something about the antecedent debt, other than the conclusory statement that there's antecedent debt. Your point is well, why would any of the debtors be paying anyone unless there was an antecedent debt?

Well, the thing is it may not be antecedent, they may be paying in advance, they may be paying that day; COD. You know, that's the response I think.

MR. FISHER: And, Your Honor, it is important to say which debtor entity we're talking about. It is important to say exactly which transferee we're talking about. As a practical matter --

THE COURT: Let me say -- I'm going to cut you short.

MR. FISHER: Yes.

THE COURT: As a -- it seems to me the problem with what you're proposing is that you may not have a basis to say in your books and records that -- at least for the face of the complaint, that defendant X was owed a debt, that this was a payment on account of you may not have it. And I think your method basically sort of puts the onus on them to make that

	- 207 -
1	part of your case for you.
2	MR. FISHER: What we're trying to avoid, Your Honor,
3	is a situation where we now go back and correct these
4	complaints by identifying the specific entities where we think,
5	as a practical matter, the movants know full well by checking
6	their own records
7	THE COURT: But that's not that's not I don't
8	think that's the test, because, again, that shifts the burden
9	of proof. You know, you basically force them to show we don't
10	know.
11	MR. FISHER: Well, then, we go back and we provide
12	them with this information. We could provide it to them in
13	documentary form under 12(e), or we could provide it to them in
14	the form of an amended complaint.
15	THE COURT: To me that's
16	MR. FISHER: And then say it's a new motion to
17	dismiss.
18	THE COURT: To me that's part of the merits of a
19	motion to amend. If, in fact, they knew and it's no big deal
20	and they know they've always known this, then that's a fact
21	in your favor as well as the fact that the law changed. You
22	know, but I think it should all be viewed in the context of a
23	motion to amend.
24	Now, I have not reviewed every complaint. But as I

I've reviewed enough to see that I think they're form

220	_

service list, you're going to have someone looking at the notice.

MS. LEE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: But that's just a preliminary view because we haven't really gotten into that and I was telling you about ruling on this yet, this aspect of it.

MS. LEE: Your Honor, Cathy Lee. I represent Ambrake Corporation and also Sumitomo Wiring Systems USA. I just wanted to understand, sort of, the figures that Your Honor is laying out to make these sort of formative arguments and actually show what individualized prejudice is. Are you saying that we would do that in response to a motion to amend? And the reason that I ask --

THE COURT: No -- no. And I understand why you're asking me because I wasn't very clear on it.

MS. LEE: Okay.

THE COURT: People are free, in response to a motion to amend the complaint, to raise whatever ports people raise in response to motions to amend. That might include things like prejudice and delay and you know, that gets into lack of notice and all of that. It's in the context of a motion to amend. As far as the 4(m) issues are concerned, I'll -- if I'm inclined to grant the motion to amend, I still have to rule on the 4(m) issues because I'm not going to, obviously, give leave to amend, where I concluded that the complaint can't succeed

- 229 -

because I would undo my 4(m) orders.

So those -- but those 4(m) issues are already briefed and argued. So I'm not going to have any more argument on them in this context. You can raise them in the context of -- to the extent that it's appropriate to raise, in the context of a motion to amend.

MS. LEE: Okay.

THE COURT: And then I -- this is me where I was confusing you, I -- pardon me if you hear my rationale for setting it up that way. Giving you my preliminary view that I probably would not simply say -- at least I don't believe I would simply say that everyone gets off scot-free because of the movants' arguments under 4(m) and Rule 60 and due process.

So I would probably -- my inclination at this point, but I may change my mind after I review the transcript and look at the papers and the briefs again, would be to say that, you know, I'd probably have to look at those issues on a case-by-case basis to some extent too. I may not on some cases. I mean, the motion papers -- the individual movants' motions may be strong enough on that issue that I would rule in their favor. You know, I confess. You know, there are eighty-some motions to dismiss; I concentrated on the global issues which is what we've been dealt -- dealing with here. It may be when I look at all the pleadings, that there will be any number of people who I believe the complaint should be dismissed, even if

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the disclosure in connection therewith were not misled by a position that's contrary to the position they're taking today.

(Pause)

On this point, although in each case the Court has to review the facts at hand so no general rule will apply in a generic way, see In re Ampace Corp., 279 B.R. 145, 159 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) and In re I. Appel Corp., 300 B.R. 564, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) as well as In re P.A.. Bergner & Co., 140 F.3d 1111, 1117 (7th Cir.1998). So that aspect of the motions to dismiss is denied.

The motions to dismiss generally also assert that the complaints as filed and served do not satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 7008, incorporating Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I agree with that assertion. And more specifically, the complaints assert preference causes of action under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. In performing the analysis required by Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), the Court must do the following.

First, the Court must identify each element of the cause of action. Next the Court must identify the allegations that are not entitled to the assumption of truth because they are legal conclusions not factual allegations. Finally, the Court must assess the factual allegations in the context of the elements of the claim to determine whether they plausibly

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suggest an entitlement to relief. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 149, 147, and 151. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement but it asks for more than a shear possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully, id. at page 149.

Here there are three key elements of a preference claim that are asserted only in a generic way, i.e. only in the sense of repeating the elements of the relevant statute and stating that as a result the defendant harmed the plaintiff, and therefore they do not satisfy the pleading requirements as set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.

First, the complaint does not identify the particular debtor, and there were over forty debtors here, who was the transferor. Secondly, the complaint does not allege a particular antecedent debt on which the transfer was on account of. And third, the complaint, where there are multiple transferees alleged, does not assert which defendant was the initial transferee and which defendants were subsequent transferees, those parties' rights being different under Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a similar context where, as here, the complaint did identify the date of the transfer and the amount of the transfer, bankruptcy courts, including the court in this district have similarly concluded as I do now that the preference complaint does not pass muster under Rule 8. See In

- 277 -

re Hydrogen, LLC, 2010 WL 1609, 536 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., April 20, 2010). In re McLaughlin, 415 B.R. 23 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009)

In re Caremerica Inc., 409 B.R. 737 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2009).

I've stated during oral argument why I believe all three of these elements of the claim need to be pled with more clarity in the context. In particular, while it may seem at first glance that anyone receiving money has to receive it for some purpose and therefore it's reasonable to infer in the context that that purpose is to pay an antecedent debt, that is not always the case. Debtors may pay COD or in advance. And in addition, in identifying the debt, a complaint may therefore also enable a debtor to show that the creditor, or the transferee, rather, received more than it would otherwise in a Chapter 7 case which would, in the case of a contract that had been subsequently assumed, be a basis for dismissing the claim.

So I concluded that the complaints need to be dismissed, and I've given DPH Holdings forty-five days from today to file a motion for each complaint seeking leave to amend each complaint. That motion should attach the form of complaint -- or must attach the form of complaint that would be proposed to be filed as an amended complaint. And if such a motion is not filed for any particular complaint, that complaint will be dismissed upon the movant submitting to me a proposed order dismissing the complaint, CC'ing on the e-mail counsel for DPH and stating that in fact notwithstanding my